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Deliberation, Capability and Action Research: knowledge and becoming   
 
Abstract  
In this short paper I examine whether obtaining the capability to change practice 
can be solely achieved through reflective action research, and how. I take as 
our framework of analysis that offered by Aristotelian thought, especially in the 
discussion of powers and potential. I conclude that action research as a way of 
changing practice cannot be only deliberative, but must be based on learning 
new, propositional knowledge through what Dunne calls ‘technical rationality’ 
(Dunne, 2011). This is needed so that reflecting, as understanding, on existing 
practices can be better realised and, importantly, augmented by new 
capabilities. This may support the idea of continued professional learning taking 
priority over reflective practice in reaching and maintaining professional 
mastery.  
 
There have been many significant contributions to the understanding of action 
research, particularly exploring its social critical theory heritage, that have resonance 
with contemporary thought. In preparing this paper I was struck not just by action 
research’s epistemological modernity (see Elliott 2007b), but how it engages with the 
ontological in terms of emancipation and its application to learning as a validating 
practice of professionals. It is the use of reflection in the action research process of 
becoming a professional that interests me, and to explore this I specifically refer to 
Aristotle’s works in the Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics (1995) to examine the 
process of obtaining the capability to become and maintain a professional identity and 
status. I take as my framework of analysis Aristotle’s discussion of powers and 
potentiality in Metaphysics IX, with reference to commentaries by Heidegger (1995), 
Witt (2003) and Eikeland (2008).  
I propose that it is not enough to suppose that a practitioner can engage in 
action research without the capability to change, regardless of any desire or intention to 
effect change in others or their own practice. Practitioners must address a range of 
knowledge needs including how they might develop their potential to understand, to 
benefit from action research. In this I support Papastephanou in her claim that the 
‘issue of the ends of action persists and demands a constant critical vigilance on the 
part of the practitioner’ (2012:110). In agreeing with her that actions include both an act 
and an end, I wonder how this vigilance is first obtained and then practised by a 
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professional. In other words, what is the relationship between a practitioner’s capability 
to engage and to understand, and to act with intention to effect change for the good of 
others and themselves? How does the evaluation of action revealed through action 
research relate to the existing learnt capabilities of the professional? Do these current 
capabilities restrict deliberation and in specific situations limit our potential to act for 
personal change? That is, what is the relationship between the unknown capabilities 
revealed through deliberation, a disposition to learn new capabilities through 
experience and the limitations to our capabilities to act that are passive, and our ability 
to reflect upon our actual practice of that agentic potentiality in reaching our goal of 
being a good, masterful and wise practitioner? 
 Aristotle might answer these questions by means of a discussion on the 
virtuous accumulation of practical experience in the Nicomachean Ethics, where he 
concludes that ‘practical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity 
to act with regard to human goods’. (1995, 1140b: 20/21). I draw two distinctions here. 
The first concerns one’s desire and ability to be, and the second one’s capacities for 
being and for becoming.1 In the first, Aristotle is not assuming one can be whatever one 
wants to be; rather, one has a disposition to become what one is able to be – an ability 
or talent. Aristotle points to the relationship between being actually and being 
potentially (1048a–1048b6). The second is discussed throughout this paper. They are 
linked, however, in a dialogue on whether action research is an instrumental tool for the 
enframing of practice within a form of epistemological scientism, as in the presencing of 
the ‘formed’ professional or the capability to change towards, always becoming, in the 
sense of ‘can be’ clearly intended by Aristotle in the opening lines of both books, ∆ and 
Θ, of his Metaphysics. It is through the Aristotelian notion of dύnamis (potential based 
on capacity to change other entities and ourselves) by energeia (action towards 
actuality) that the questions about our being and becoming are addressed (see 
commentaries by Heidegger, 1995; Weiss, 1987; and Dunne, 1993).  
 
Action research as building wise professional capability 
There is a comprehensive literature on action research and its place in stimulating the 
professional practitioner actively to evaluate the quality of their practice (Li, 2008). The 
debate on its role as either as an instrument of professional practice development or as 
                                                           
1
 Beere suggest that he believes that ‘Aristotle’s definition of motion requires us to accept 
capabilities for being that are distinct from capacities for becoming and whose energeia is a 
case of being, not becoming’ (2009: 204). This notion seems to make phenomenological sense 
and is seen in the interaction of social life by Schatz (1967). 
  
 
3
the prime investigative tool is illustrated by Elliott (1998, 2005, 2007a, 2007b); 
Hammersley (2004); Papastephanou (2006, 2012); Kemmis (2009); and McNiff and 
Whitehead (2010), amongst others, and I do not intend to explore it further here. It is 
sufficient for this investigation to note Hammersley’s conclusion that ‘the core feature of 
action research seems to be that there should be an intimate relationship between 
research and some form of practical or political activity—such that the focus of inquiry 
arises out of, and its results feed back into, the activity concerned’ (2004: 165). Action 
research, then, may be considered as a praxis that reveals opportunities for personal 
change, albeit initially revealed in a specific situation (in a form of practical reasoning), 
as discussed extensively by Kemmis and Smith (2008); or it may be considered a 
poiesis, a form of production intent on improving the efficiency of the practitioner in 
respect to external quality criteria.2  
A clear theme in the literature is recognition that it is not sufficient for the 
practitioner’s use of action research to have no teleological purpose; the intention must 
be to improve professional practice. Action research is a way for the professional to 
take a stance on who they are or who they desire to be. It is not a process of discovery 
that can only be concluded once our journey has ended. Action research has made a 
significant contribution to an understanding of our agency in our everydayness that 
contains intention and may have moral, political and utilitarian objectives beyond the 
presencing of the research and into the ontological preparedness of being. Moreover, if 
these intentions they are to be realised they require both the latent ability to perform 
the change required (to act) and a worthwhile reason to do so. Is it impossible to 
undertake action research with no consideration of professionals’ potential capabilities, 
for they will determine the scope of response to reflection and feedback  Then, the 
limitations of their potential critical powers and their knowledge will constrain the 
advantages of such reflection. 
Our very being is thus constituted by our choices and our actions and is thereby 
contingent. The temporal stability of our practical identity is about how, through 
deliberation, we decide the form of our being in the process of becoming the entity we 
seek to become. For Aristotle, action is normative:  
 
(T)he man who is without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is 
capable to aim, in accordance with calculation, at the best for many of the 
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 This definition excludes the notion of theoria that some maintain (e.g. Hammersley, 2004), but 
this argument does not need such a concept.  
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things attainable by action. Nor is practical wisdom concerned only with 
universals – it must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice 
is concerned with particulars. (1141b: 12–15) 
 
We engage with new activities supporting this notion of our reconstituted self, 
and avoid others, as a process of becoming, giving a consistency to our identity 
through the choices we take and the actions we engage in when our practical identities 
clash. This creates dilemmas to be solved in ways that best protect the form of identity 
we use to guide our actions. Guidance is provided in the principles and practice upheld 
by the professional body, once the will to be such a professional is disclosed and 
admitted. However, how do we make the judgement of knowing even whether to act, 
and what capability is required to deliberate on the actions undertaken; and how do we 
develop the skills and practices(téchnē) to act? This raises a key issue. How do 
acquired skills and the practice that they form become powerful enough to shape new 
circumstances, when their use differs from how they were originated so as to be ready-
at-hand in new and novel situations? This awareness of oneself and one’s action, and 
any consequential capability to act to change, comes from our understanding of the 
work world in which we exist, our familiarity with it and our disposition to move towards 
the becoming of a professional, and the call upon us to respond. Thus our potential to 
be, the power to change what and who we are, is linked to our actuality and our 
judgements and values.  
The point in returning to Aristotle’s notion of gnoseology is not to deny the 
benefits of action research, of which there are many well documented instances. A 
leading contributor, Kemmis (2010a), discussed action research in changing practice 
and understanding, and in praxis (2010b), in scholarly examples suggesting a wide 
notion  not restricted to a constrained notion of phronēsis and praxis reliant on 
experience. This is supported by Dunne’s claims that in ‘becoming experienced, he has 
been involved not only in acquiring information but also, through this very acquiring, in 
a process of self-formation’ (Dunne, 1993: 130). Without an externality to mediate what 
is already unfolding into something transformative, action research is either limiting 
regarding what is known, or it is overly idealistic, implying that a world outside the 
person either does not exist or is not available to the person 
 Aristotle introduces phronēsis in his earlier books, Posterior Analytics and 
Problems, but discusses it in most detail in Book VI of Nicomachean Ethics. Here he 
discusses the nature of truth and places practical wisdom in the five forms of knowing; 
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‘art, knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, comprehension’ (1139b15). The 
goodness of poiesis can be determined by judging the quality of the product or end 
achieved, that is, the object produced by using craft knowledge or skill (téchnē); for 
example, the goodness of the practice of teaching shipbuilding is determined by the 
quality of the ships constructed. Determining what counts as a good end, however, is 
ultimately the result of theoretical deliberation (theoria), with its own form of 
generalisable knowledge (epistēmē) and judgement (sophia). Praxis, on the other 
hand, is concerned with a different kind of end: ethical action.3 The end or telos of 
praxis is not an end in the usual sense at all, but some morally worthwhile good that 
cannot be determined in advance and must be discovered in particular contexts and 
situations. Praxis involves acting appropriately to lead a good life, meshing ends and 
means, since the ‘discernment of the ‘good’ that constitutes its end is inseparable from 
a discernment of its mode of expression’ (Carr, 1987: 169). The ends and means of 
praxis cannot be easily distinguished: how teachers teach becomes what they teach. 
Such knowledge informs Aristotle’s observation: ‘practical wisdom, then, must 
be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods’ (1140b: 
20/21), and is a form of rationality that deals with opinion. Moreover, Aristotle argues 
that the experience of the practically wise gives their opinions equal validity with 
demonstrated (empirical) fact. Green (2009) suggests that professional practice is an 
interrelationship of: 
• Phronēsis which covers practitioners’ capacity to employ practical rationality 
(not technical rationality) 
• Praxis which deals with practitioners acting in ways that further the goods of the 
practice. Here, the moral dimension of professional practice is being 
emphasised 
• Aporia which refers to the ‘confrontation in one’s practice with irresolvable 
problematics, or paradoxes’ (2006: 11).  
 
Kristjánsson (2005) discerns three perspectives from which the revival of 
Aristotelian ideas has been carried out: the ethos perspective, the logos perspective 
and the phronēsis–praxis perspective (PPP). Kristjánsson makes a compelling case 
against the dominance of the PPP in thinking about phronēsis, and I suggest that such 
a reading is correct where phronēsis is taken as a unitary, self-contained way of being 
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 Kemmis and Smith hold that praxis is distinct from both theoria and epistēmē (2008: 271), not 
a position supported by my reading of Aristotle’s gnoesology, which is integrated.   
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that elevates it beyond constitutional knowledge. I would argue that Aristotle balances 
epistēmē and phronēsis so that the latter is not too self-indulgent, and recognises the 
need for constant reference to epistemic givens. The answer might be in the way 
Aristotle understands theory: theoria, not as something detached from practice as in 
theorisis, but as something of an overview of an issue to be ontologically decided. It is 
feasible at least that the good theoritikos will review the whole issue and realise that a 
phronetic decision cannot be grounded on available knowledge. This creates a 
distinction between views as effective thinking rather than critical thinking. The kind of 
thinking that pertains to this paradigm is ‘effective’, and we reserve the term ‘critical’ for 
a more comprehensive kind of thinking that has a strong aporetic quality 
(Papastephanou and Angeli, 2007: 614). It is feasible (Eikeland, 2008; Papastephanou, 
2013) that theoria can be the connecting element mediating between epistēmē and 
phronēsis and this support the position of Lear (1988), that episteme itself is reflective, 
for one ‘cannot understand the world unless one understands the place of 
understanding within it’ (ibid, 8).  
This, of course, needs textual evidence from Aristotle.4 It is through the quality 
of our deliberative reflection that our power to realise our potentiality in achieving a 
prior actuality is revealed. However, such a revelation requires the mediation of 
phronēsis, the practical wisdom that, combined with perception and intuition, enables 
action within the phenomena of everyday life, whereas epistēmē or theoretical 
knowledge concerns itself with principles rather than the practicalities of living within 
the mortal world.5 The ability to make practical judgements is based on deliberation and 
practical reasoning, mediated by experience and a discernment of the situation. 
Outside of the strictly Aristotelian framework, an easy way out is to say that the 
decision maker will know that more epistēmē is needed if the problem persists in one 
way or another. What is more demanding is a case where the problem is solved 
(though in a way that challenges the felicity of phronetic decision in ways that remain 
imperceptible to the decision maker). In response to this is the kind of aporetic critical 
thinking that problematises the unproblematic. So, the decision maker will not quite 
know that they need more knowledge, but rather suspect that they do through 
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 A view expressed in a private conversation with Papastephanou, 24.4.2013.  
5
 According to Papastephanou (2012), Aristotle’s gnoseology (knowledge) is determined by the 
fact that the knower is always related to a known in multiple ways. Those segments of reality 
that are not produced, modified or developed artificially invite theoretical ways of knowing. This 
effort may result in episteme, that is, in a systematically searched, adequately stabilised and 
secure knowledge about external things that display some regularity. 
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awareness of the inconclusive character of thought procedures and by asking deeper 
questions that thematise the very apparent questionless-ness of daily normalcy.  
This clearly needs time away from action and a learnt capacity to reason 
critically. Moreover, this criticality has to be one where the reality in which thinking is 
undertaken considers the realities in which theoria and epistēmē have their relevance. 
Aristotelian notions of the level for mortal understanding and deference to ultimate 
understanding (sophia) to the gods may be indicated as sympathy within Aristotle’s 
own gnoseology. This idea’s argument follows the propositions of critical realism that 
question a mono-pre-determined reality, but support a laminated notion of realities for 
research (Bhaskar and Danermark, 2006). Such a conceptualisation allows insights to 
be drawn about the unknowable and ends of the action. Moreover, it avoids the cynical 
trap found in Socrates’ dialogue with Meno (Plato, 80: d–e) of not being able to know 
what one does not know because, if one could know it, then one would have known it! 
The response reviewed in the Nicomachean Ethics is the multi-dimensional realities of 
morals and Gods that constitute Aristotle’s gnoseology.  
For Aristotle, dύnamis is both the power to change and the potential to change. 
For instance, we need to want and have the disposition to change the state in which we 
currently exist; but that is not sufficient. We also need the means to do this, and the two 
need to be synchronised. To want to be actually better at something is not sufficient to 
warrant the end one wants. One must also have learnt and understood the skills 
necessary to be capable of achieving the end. We might want to play for Arsenal, and 
have learnt the skills of a football player as we see them, but morphologically we are 
too small, heavy or tall to be able actually to achieve the status of becoming a 
professional football player. We may be timid, thoughtful or unable to comprehend the 
tactics or the social norms of football players.  
Quoting directly from Aristotle on what he means by dύnamis: 
 
it is clear that actuality is prior to potentiality. And I mean by 
potentiality not only that definite kind which is said to be a principle 
of change in another thing or in the thing itself regards as other, but 
in general every principle of movement or rest.... To all such 
potentiality, then, actuality is prior both in formula and in substance: 
and in time it is prior in one sense, in another, not. (1049b: 5–11) 
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Aristotle sees the relationship between potentiality and actuality as one where actuality 
takes priority over potentiality. In this he means that our potentiality is towards 
something that must exist prior to our current state, in order that we can potentially 
become that. His examples from nature make this point more directly. A child is 
potentially an adult, and not to seek to be so is unnatural; a craftsman seeks to be a 
master builder and needs an image of what this is to aspire to it and take a stance on 
becoming. These two examples, of course, concern different aspects of the 
actualisation of potential. One is the progress of nature, the other the deliberate use of 
one’s powers to shape what one might be. Witt summarises this well when she states 
that the priority ‘in being is ontological priority, it refers to the existential dependency of 
being potentially on being actually’ (2003: 78). However, this is not an issue of 
suddenly coming to know without learning or practice. In all cases learning is based on 
existing skills and capabilities, as Aristotle claims, ‘of that which is coming to be, some 
part must have come to be, and, of that which, in general, is changing, some part must 
have changed’ (1049b: 35). Moreover, as Ide points out, ‘capacity is necessary for 
potentiality although capability is divorced from possibility’ (1992: 25). That is, we might 
have the potential but not actualise the possibilities this may confer. This distinction is 
both a counter to actualism and tends to be overlooked in the action research literature 
(See Dick’s review of the literature, 2011). For Aristotle, the agent power is an entity 
acting upon the passive power of the recipient of the action. They are distinctively 
different and form two entities. The distinction is the separation of acquired powers of 
learning and practice from natural, maturational powers. This is a problem for my use 
of dύnamis in personal change through professional development, as foreseen by Witt 
(and by Beere 2009: 59) who comment that if ‘an object changes itself, as, for example 
a doctor might cure herself, then Aristotle’s different object requirements holds that we 
must divide the doctor into agent and patient’ (ibid: 42). 
Witt (2003) explains the difference between the non-rational and natural 
potential for being that is biologically triggered – child to man – and the rational 
potential caused by agency towards other and ourselves as in trying to become a good 
professional. Witt proposes that ‘what exists potentially is ontologically dependent on 
what exists actually, but what exists actually is not ontologically dependent on what 
exists potentially’ (2003: 13).  
Aristotle distinguishes how powers are acquired; some are innate and others, 
those that are rational, are obtained through learning and practice (1047b: 31–35) and 
how they may be used. Acquisition of these powers is to a being already able to 
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undertake and use the learning so acquired, which supports Aristotle’s premise that 
actuality is prior to potentiality but only in the sense of being able to learn and act. How 
to act with these capabilities upon those we might decide to do is deliberation: we 
deliberate through critically thinking about things that are in our power and can be done 
(1112a: 31), and ‘not about ends but about what contributes to ends’ (1112b: 13). We 
deliberate where we recognise we have a choice, and where we may involve others ‘to 
aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting ourselves as not being up to 
the task’ (1112b: 10–11). The deliberation of what might be otherwise is a type of 
plausible reasoning that, according to Aristotle, is the syllogistic form of deductive logic. 
Deliberation is not about ends but ‘what contributes to ends’ (1112b: 12) and, 
moreover, once we have made our choice, Aristotle leads us through The Rhetoric to 
the ‘use of persuasive speech to lead to decisions’ (1939b: 18).  
Deliberation is, according to Eikeland, a ‘general and common competence that 
presupposes more specialised and substantial competences and insight’ (2008: 459). 
This does not contradict the notion of acting in a recognised but unfamiliar situation 
without deliberation, as an expert is able to do; rather, it is a complement and offers 
justification where others need to be convinced. In this is reveals theory, technical 
knowledge, judgement and values and may well signal changes in practice (Luntley, 
2001). 
Clarity needs to be sought here in respect of the realisation of latent capabilities 
in action, for one would assume that these may be revealed through contemplation 
prior to deliberation. For Aristotle, however, such transformation is not evident. 
Contemplation is not a precursor to action but to intellectual reasoning (1178a:8–
1179a: 32), and therefore is not the equivalent of self-reflection.6 Indeed, Aristotle 
scoffs at such an idea (1213a: 1–8) for reasons diametrically opposed to Marx’s 
comment: ‘philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to 
change it’ (1998: 571).  
But this is a shift from the priority of actuality to the priority of possibility. The 
idea seems to be that you either possess a capability evidenced in action or not. 
Indeed, Beere claims that Aristotle prioritises what he calls the ‘Being-in-energeia over 
the being-in-capability in terms of a person who merely has but is not using their 
knowledge is a knower to a lesser degree (than)… the person who is using their 
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 It has been suggested that Aristotle considered self-reflection as self-control but not as self-realisation 
(Pakaluk, 2005). However, I prefer to consider it as a dialogue between passive and active agentic within 
the agentic I. In this way Aristotle’s premise that reflection on action is first amongst friends (1172a10 –
14) and internalised once it has been established in the company of others. (see Eikeland, 2008: 352–355). 
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knowledge fully really, truly, and is in the higher degree a knower’ (2009: 176). The 
support for this comes from Aristotle when he claims that the ‘actuality is the end, and 
that it is for the sake of this that the potentiality is acquired’ (1050a: 99–10). Dunne 
attributes this almost exclusively to téchnē (as the transformation of dύnamis and 
energeia this has resonance with certain models of action research: see Kemmis, 
2010a and Dunne, 1993). My point, developed from a reading of Burnyeat (2012), is 
that the critical issue is not simply achievement of the end by the best 
conceptualisation of the end: it requires not just knowledge in practice, but 
understanding. This understanding requires one’s being aware of insufficient or 
inadequate knowledge and needs knowledge as epistēmē. For Aristotle the problem is 
clear, in that we make mistakes in our presumption of truth when ‘either we cannot 
grasp anything higher apart from the particular, or we can but it is nameless for objects 
of different in sort or that of which it is proved is in fact a whole which is a pert of 
something else’ (74a7/8). 
How, then, do we explain those situations when we say, ‘I did not know I could 
do that!’, or ‘I did not know I should have known that’, even when such lack of 
knowledge did not prevent me securing the end of my willed action’? For the moment, I 
assume that reflecting on the actuality of practice maintains priority over the potentiality 
to learn from reflection, provided the passive powers exist and are sufficient for 
reflection upon action research to activate this potentiality. Such capabilities, however, 
may be missing if they were not previously learnt or practised, because the agent is 
unable or unwilling to obtain them for use in the reflective cycle of action research. For 
example, if teachers do not recognise (both in the sense of knowing and 
understanding) a specific form of learning difficulty in a child, they are less able to offer 
support by reflecting on a specific  problematic instance than those who do have this 
epistēmē7 or theoria to conceptualise an end, regardless of their perceived wisdom. As 
Aristotle proclaims, ‘potentiality is discovered from actuality’ (1051a: 31). However, it 
seems for Aristotle that to have capability, learnt or practised, does not reflect one’s 
level of competence or expertise. You may have the capability to be great or average, 
yet your actualisation of that capability constrains your possibilities. If I know about 
distributing drugs as a nurse but do not care about the patient, I will not understand 
what it is to be a good nurse. This is the essence of motion as the sense of alteration 
that is, utilisation of capability as ‘actual exercise, activation of the capable as capable; 
                                                           
7 I am using epistēmē in the sense of Burnyeat (2012), where he claims Aristotle uses it in the 
Posterior Analytics either to refer to the cognitive state of the knowing person or to a body of 
knowledge.  
  
 
11
for example, it is not simply the presence of the wood as buildable, but the actual 
exercise of this potential in the activity of building’ (Gonzalez, 2006: 536). 
So how does one acquire dύnamis, and what is its relationship to knowledge; to 
Aristotle’s gnoseology? Exploration of our being provides the potential for us to 
understand our life project and to seek it (of course, we need more substantial change 
if we are on the wrong trajectory). It is not deterministic, but neither is it unencumbered; 
it requires a blending of knowledge, such as téchnē, praxis and epistēmē, in order that 
we might have power to reflect and deliberate on the good to be achieved by our 
actions. The thinking that is the deliberative act is not contemplation by critical thought. 
This is the key to the dύnamis transformation from abstract idea to concrete form 
(Eikeland, 2008: 176). Through deliberation, it amounts to an examination of our way of 
dealing with knowledge and how, through noeis, we are able to consider the fallibility of 
our actions and the alternatives that might have been. Through this form of thinking we 
come to understand our actions and reflect on more suitable ways of achieving our 
goals. Critical thought reveals the deficiency in both our potential to act and our ability 
to do so; our deficiency in critical thinking constrains our ability to master our 
profession. Critical thinking, aided by epistemological interventions, operates through 
theoretical frameworks and the praxis of our actions. In so deliberating we are able to 
move in ‘a more comprehensive way, towards a practical act as is conclusion instead 
of producing just another theoretical assertion deductively, saying something about 
something’ (Eikeland, 2008: 134–135). Such deliberation presupposes adequate 
knowledge of the subject; lack or insufficiency, will limit change to  ‘good enough’ 
solutions at best. Indeed, I propose  central to the  learning process of action research 
is  the revealing and problematising of the unknown.  
 
Concluding comments 
Returning then to the action research literature, I am drawn to the argument 
(e.g. Elliott, 2007a) that action research can contribute to the building of capability for 
worthwhile change. In this respect, action research is not a specialist set of skills 
relevant onlyfor certain circumstances although, according to Carr and Kemmis, it 
might well be that we have a multifaceted and transdisciplinary way of being. Action 
research can have a function of transdisciplinary production that leads to new ideas 
and knowledge becoming available to others. Indeed, Barnett (1997) suggests that 
practice might be shared across disciplines to build ‘critical interdisciplinarity’ (Barnett, 
1997) in which the different assumptions and values underlying disciplines are 
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explored, thereby reconnecting questions of professional development and pedagogy 
to academic disciplines and research.  
Moreover, action research may ‘improves practice by developing the practitioner’s 
capacity for discrimination and judgement, in particular complex situations. It can unify 
inquiry, improve performance and ‘the development of the person in their professional 
role’ (Elliott, 1998: 54). This capability is an ontological driver of the actuality of 
becoming what we desire to be. It is made manifest by questioning the reality, of our 
everyday experience with the knowledge that we have, and with a preparedness to 
create new knowledge. Yet this might be insightful to act for new possibilities to shine 
through.  Reflection in context is reflecting on the mirror image of what is set to be, the 
trajectory of closure rather than one of difference8,  So  whilst I acknowledginge the 
development of action research within Stenhouse’s notion of teacher researcher 
(1984), abut it has a substantial contribution beyond one’s professional situation. Action 
research, in the sense of creating and reproducing practical knowledge testable in the 
world of practice, ais the a fusion of practice and theory in praxis. It creates an 
understanding of how the potentiality of being can be made manifest as performance. . 
For Indeed many this will seem like a teleological approach where we take a stance on 
the authentic being we want to be. Luntley inventively argues, ‘it might turn out that 
expert practice brings to light rules and discriminations hitherto missed’ (2011: 37). It is 
this questioning of what might be rather than the ability to be what one takes oneself to 
be but some how better As Haraway and Barad sugges the use of diffraction not in 
place of self reflection where this is meant but where change  is desired the metaphor 
diffraction open up more  possibilities, it is “about making a change in the world rather 
than being endlessly reflective( Haraway, 2000: 104).  That  is diffraction” does not 
produce ‘the same’ displaced, 
as reflection and refraction do. Diffraction is a mapping of interference, not of 
replication, reflection, or reproduction (Haraway, 1992:300).  Reflection can  lead to  a 
closed approach rather than providing the conditions, language and conceptual 
metaphors for significant transformational change.  To this extent the notable work of 
Haraway  significant.     
Supporting some of the claims of Kristjánsson (2005), action research cannot 
be just phronēsis, for phronēsis is practical perfection of both ethical and intellectual 
virtues. Action research is an act of being and phronēsis contributes to that. The 
stipulation for action research, surely, is that it is worthwhile and contributory. 
                                                           
8
 I am grateful for a reviewer of this paper for the insight shown to me here. 
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Undertaken in any workplace, it needs to be performed with a virtuous disposition and 
realised in worthwhile action as simply the application of the téchnē of action research 
cannot do. Without a sound prior understanding of the issues, there is little potential for 
action research to offer the desired significant ontological change to professional lived 
experience. The argument is that, in order to question the observed situation 
effectively, basic capabilities need to be present in order that a difference might to 
achived. Reflections about snow, for instance, differ with one’s historical perspective. If 
you are an Eskimo, the range of your potential actions differs from that of a nomad 
from the Sahara Desert. This is a question of practice in relation to the reality of snow 
or how one might choice to take snow to be. Snow has different meaning depending on 
the skilfulness of the practitioner and the use to which it is put. Following the lead of 
Eikeland (2008: 465), I ask whether action research has been too easily adopted into 
enquiry without sufficient attention to the development of epistēmē and téchnē, and 
whether critical thought is able to act in the most appropriate (not perfect, but well 
informed) way on the potential for change revealed by the action research process as 
reflection for action. This might be seen as a specific and individualist question, and I 
would support the idea that, unless one understands what is good for ‘one’, it is difficult 
to know what is good for others. However, action research needs others and isolation 
from the social context of knowledge production. To ignore this closes the open spaces 
and systems that are combined in the philosophical position of critical realism and the 
emergence of transdisciplinary knowledge and transdisciplinary professions. Such 
emergence is coherent with the reading of Aristotle’s gnoseology as a more practical 
way of knowing suggested earlier, but a detailed examination is beyond this current 
paper. 
Without what Rorty (1999) would describe as systematic learning, we are not in 
a position to inquire and question what we have taken for granted to gain an 
understanding of our tradition and limited way of being. Certainly, help from others in 
the form of critical companions may be a helpful way to improve one’s potential to 
reflect on action but, unless help is at hand to engage in the change, the implicit value 
of action research may be lost. 
There is a concern that if action research is accepted in the form taken as 
unproblematic for professional development, it assumes that reflection will provide the 
potential for change. My argument is that reflection releases exciting capabilities, learnt 
prior to the capability to reflect but is fallible for it can not extend beyond one’s exiting 
knowledge or readily reveal alternatives. Action research can only provide change to 
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the extent that participants are able to recognise the full potential for change, and that 
this recognition is directly related to their capability pre-existing the reflection to act. It is 
because of this that one needs to be cautious about professionals engaging in action 
research when their aim is not the realisation of the potential to take a stance on one's 
being, but the confirmation of existing knowledge sets. Action research should involve 
a personal change in the agentic professional, supported by others whose own 
reflections increase the potential empowerment of capability to act wisely for 
themselves and for others. This practical, wise identity judges as a creator, blending 
dynamic experiences in a complex manifold of skills and experiences. The skill is in 
knowing when, and then to make judgements based on deliberation, interpretation, 
reflection, and practical reasoning, mediated by experience and a discernment of the 
situation. Specifically, deliberation is not measured by time but by the correctness of 
what is beneficial; about the right thing, the right way, and at the right time.  
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